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Can Police Search Your 
CeLL Phone, and Even 
Breal< Your Password, 
During an Arrest? 
Over the las t decade, cell phone use has exploded. Many Americans now carry incredible amounts of information in their phones, including pictures, 
documents, music, text messages, and emails. Not surpris-
ingly, the fac t that cell phones are carried in public and 
hold enormous amounts of data has made them attractive 
targets for law enforcement. 
This is a condensed version of a previously pub-
lished article. Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? 
Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone From a Search 
Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125 (2011) (reprinted 
with permission). 
In recen t yea rs, 
prosecutors have so ught 
to admit evidence from 
cell phone sea rches 
based o n the sea rch 
incident to arrest doc-
trine. That doctrine -
which has been used by 
police on the street for 
decades - allows po li ce 
to conduct a complete 
sea rch of the items on 
an arrestee fo llowing 
any custodial arres t. 
Searching cell phones 
following an arrest 
obviously gives law 
enfo rcement access to 
fa r more information 
than a traditional sea rch 
of a wallet o r jacket 
pocket. Yet m any courts 
have agreed with prose-
cuto rs and upheld cell 
phone sea rches incident 
to arrest, even if there 
was no reason for law 
enfo rcement to believe 
the pho ne contained 
evidence related to the 
arrest. 
This article discuss-
es the stunningly broad 
scope of the sea rch inci-
dent to arrest doctrine 
as applied to cell 
phones. After explaining why curren t Supreme Court 
precedent seemingly authorizes such broad searches, the 
article goes a step further and explores a question that 
courts have not yet been forced to confront: Can police 
search cell phones that have been password protected? 
Password-protected phones raise tough issues, including 
whether police can try to break a password themselves 
without an owner's consent, and whether they can demand 
that an arrestee turn over the password without violating 
Miranda or the Fifth Amendment protection aga inst self-
incrimination. Although the answers to these questions are 
tricky, the bottom line is that police authority under the 
search incident to arrest doctrine is so vast that even pass-
word protecting the phone leaves defendants with minimal 
legal protection . In the end, if the Supreme Court main-
tains its current search incident to arrest doctrine, little will 
stand in the way of police extracting enormous informa-
tion from defendants' cell phones, even without a warrant 
or probable cause. 
The Supreme Court's Search 
Incident to Arrest Doctrine 
The starting point fo r the broad sea rch incident to 
arrest doctrine is the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in 
Chime! v. California.' In Chimel, the Court supp ressed evi-
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dence found when police sea rched Ted 
Chimel's entire home, including his attic 
and garage, following an arrest for bur-
glary. Despite suppressing the evidence, 
the Chimel decision provided broad 
authority for the police to search incident 
to arrest. The Court held that contempo-
raneous with a lawful arrest, police could 
search for weapons that an arrestee could 
use against the officer and to prevent an 
arrestee from concealing or destroying 
evidence. The Court limited the scope of 
the search to the arrestee's person and the 
area within his immediate control from 
which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destroy evidence. Thus, while 
police cou ld not rummage through 
Chimel's entire house following arrest, 
they were free to search anywhere on his 
person or his immediate grabbing space. 
A few years after Chimel, in United 
States v. Robinson, the Court moved a step 
further and clarified that police could 
open closed containers when searching 
incident to arrest. ' Police arrested Willie 
Robinson for the crime of operating a 
motor vehicle with a revoked license. 
During a search incident to arrest of 
Robinson's person, the arresting officer 
felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket 
but was unsure of what it was. The officer 
reached into the pocket and pulled out a 
crumpled cigarette package. Still unsure 
what was in the package, the officer 
opened it and discovered capsules of 
heroin. Even though Robinson was not 
initially arrested for a drug crime and the 
officer had no reason to believe the pack-
age in his pocket contained drugs, the 
Supreme Court upheld the search. The 
Court announced a bright-line rule per-
mitting police officers to open and search 
through all items on an arrestee's person, 
even if they are in a closed container, and 
even if the officers have no suspicion that 
the contents of the container are illegal. 
In its next series of important search 
incident to arrest decisions, the Supreme 
Court turned its attention to automobiles. 
In the first case - New York v. Belton' -
the Court expanded its bright-line rule to 
permit searches incident to arrest of the 
entire interior of automobiles (although 
not the trunk) following a valid arrest. In 
Belton, the officer stopped a car for speed-
ing and, upon smelling marijuana, arrest-
ed the occupants. With the occupants 
safely removed frol11 the vehicle, the offi-
cer then searched the passenger compart-
ment of the car and found a jacket in the 
backseat. The officer unzipped the jacket 
pockets and found cocaine. In upholding 
the search of the jacket, the Co urt 
explained the value of "a straightforward 
rule, easily applied and predictably 
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enforced.'" To make matters simple and 
predictable, the Court permitted police, 
following a lawful arrest, to search the 
entire passenger compartment of a vehicle 
and to open any containers inside the 
vehicle regardless of whether they could 
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime. 
After years of expanding the scope of 
the search incident to arrest doctrine, the 
Supreme Court scaled back police author-
ity to search vehicles incident to arrest in 
2009. In Arizona v. Cant ,"' police arrested 
the defendant for driving with a suspend-
ed license, handcuffed him, and placed 
him in the back of a police car. Thereafter, 
police searched Rodney Gant's vehicle and 
found a jacket in the backseat that con-
tained cocaine. The Cant Court narrowed 
the Belton rule and held that police can 
only search a vehicle incident to arrest if 
"the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger com-
partment at the time of the search" or if"it 
is reasonable to believe evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest might be found in 
the vehicle." " While the Cant decision is 
clearly an effort to narrow the search inci-
dent to arrest doctrine, at present the deci-
sion is only applicable to searches of vehi-
cles and it is debatable how much change 
it will foster. 
Searching Cell Phones 
Incident to Arrest 
As wireless technology has become 
ubiquitous, courts have been called upon 
to apply the search incident to arrest doc-
trine to digital devices. The first such 
cases began to appear in the mid-1990s 
and involved very simple pagers and 
beepers that stored only phone numbers 
and short messages. Courts universally 
upheld the search incident to arrest of 
such devices. For example, in United 
States v. Chan,' police activated a pager 
and retrieved telephone numbers that 
linked Sam Chan to a drug ring. The fed-
eral court upheld the search of Chan's 
pager because it was nothing more than 
an electronic container and Supreme 
Court precedent authorized the search of 
containers incident to arrest. The court 
further explained that it was irrelevant 
that the arrestee could not retrieve a 
weapon from the pager nor plausibly 
destroy any evidence from the pager. Put 
simply, the court embraced the search 
incident to arrest doctrine's bright-line 
rule for wireless technology and saw no 
reason to distinguish pagers from tradi-
tional searches of luggage, boxes, and 
other containers. Following Chan, half a 
dozen other courts upheld similar search-
es of pagers.8 
In the years following the Chan deci-
sion upholding the search inciden t to 
arrest of pagers, cell phone use increased 
dramatically in the United Sta tes. Early 
generation cell phones were not markedly 
different than pagers, but did contain 
additional data such as outgoing call logs 
and text messages. And law enforcement 
officers quickly recognized that drug deal-
ers could use cell phones to text their drug 
transactions without having to speak on 
the phone. Accordingly, police began to 
sea rch cell phones incident to arrest and 
courts were called upon beginning in the 
mid-2000s to assess the constitutionality 
of such searches. 
Although it is impossible to know 
how many cell phone searches have been 
conducted incident to arrest over the last 
few years, the number is likely in the thou-
sands: [n many instances, police likely 
found nothing incriminating and in other 
cases defendants likely pleaded guilty 
without challenging the constitutionality 
of the searches. Nevertheless, more than 
50 defendants have challenged the war-
rantless search of ea rly generation cell 
phones over the last few years. In a hand-
ful of cases, courts have addressed 
whether these warrantless sea rches were 
permissible under the automobile excep-
tion,'" the inventory exception," the exi-
gency exception,'2 or based on consent." 
The bulk of warrantless cell phone search-
es, however, have been decided under the 
search inciden t to arrest doctri ne, and 
courts have upheld the searches in the vast 
majority of cases.'" 
The most prominent case upholding 
the search incident to arrest of a cell 
phone is the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Finley.' s After arresting 
Jacob Finley as part of a staged drug sale, 
police searched the cell phone in his pock-
et incident to arrest. Officers found 
incriminating text messages related to 
drug trafficking, and Finley was subse-
quently convicted. 
On appeal, Finley contended that the 
search of his cell phone was unlawful 
because the Fourth Amendment permit-
ted only the seizure, not the warrantless 
search, of his phone. Just as in the pager 
context, the Fifth Circuit refused to draw a 
distinction between wireless technology 
and searches of more traditional contain-
ers. The court explained that "police offi-
cers are not constrained to search only for 
weapons or instruments of escape on the 
arrestee's person; they may also, without 
any additional justification, look for evi-
dence of the arrestee's crime on his person 
in order to preserve it for use at trial."'· In 
short, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize 
any conceptual difference between search-
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ing physical containers for drugs and 
sea rching electronic equipment for digital 
information. 
Although the Finley decision has 
been cited repeatedly as the leading deci-
sion, a small number of courts have 
refused to follow its reasoning." These 
courts have employed a variety of ratio-
nales in rejecting warrantless searches of 
cell phones. 
The Ohio Supreme Court, in a recent 
and closely divided 4-3 opinion, is the 
most prominent court to reject the search 
incident to arrest of cell phones.'8 In State 
v. Smith, the police executed a controlled 
drug-buy in which text messages and call 
records from the arrestee's phone con-
firmed his involvement in the drug sale. 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit panel in Finley, 
the Ohio Supreme Court refused to 
accept the crucial premise that cell 
phones are just like any other container 
that might hold other objects inside. The 
four-justice majority maintained that to 
be a container under the Supreme Court's 
decision in Belton, the item must be capa-
ble of holding a "physical object within 
it." '? Because cell phones hold only intan-
gible data, they could not be containers. 
Moreover, the majority ruled that the 
search incident to arrest doctrine should 
not apply to cell phones because even 
basic cell phones "are capable of storing a 
wealth of digitized information wholly 
unlike any physical object found within a 
closed container." 20 The court thus 
authorized police to seize a cell phone 
incident to arrest, but demanded that 
police obtain a warrant before "intruding 
into the phone's contents."" 
A federal district judge in California 
offered a different rationale for rejecting 
the search incident to arrest of cell 
phones. In United States v. Park, the defen-
dant was arrested on drug charges and 
brought to the police station.22 At the sta-
tion, approximately 90 minutes following 
the arrest, the police sea rched his cell 
phone and located incriminating infor-
mation. Like the Ohio Supreme Court, 
the Park court focused on the "immense 
amounts of private information" that can 
be stored on cell phones, explaining that 
"address books, ca lendars, vo ice and text 
messages, email, video, and pictures" 
could revea l "highly personal informa-
tion."" However, the Park court did not 
reject the idea that cell phones were con-
tainers. Rather, the court asserted that cell 
phones "should not be characterized as an 
element of [an ] individual 's clothing or 
jJerson, but rather as a possession within 
an arrestee's immediate control that has 
Fourth Amendment protection at the sta-
tion house."21 The Park court pointed to a 
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famous Supreme Court case - United 
States v. Chadwick - in which the Court 
rej ected the search incident to arrest of a 
large footlocker that had been transported 
to the police station. The Chadwick deci-
sion seemed to draw a distinction between 
searches of the person, such as clothing or 
a cigarette package in a pocket, and 
searches of possessions within an 
arrestee's immediate control, such as a 
footlocker. According to the Park court's 
interpretation of the Chadwick decision, 
items associated with the person of the 
arrestee can be searched at the scene or 
later at the police station, but items with-
in the arrestee's immediate control can 
only be searched incident to arrest at the 
scene, not later at the police station. The 
Park court then determined that because 
of the sheer volume of private informa-
tion held on cell phones, they should be 
considered possessions within the 
arrestee's immediate control. And because 
the search incident to arrest of Park's cell 
phone occurred at the station, it was 
impermissible. 
At least two courts have offered a 
third rationale for suppressing searches of 
cell phones by looking to the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Arizona v. 
Cant." In Cant, the Supreme Court 
restricted searches incident to arrest of 
automobiles to situations in which "the 
arrestee is unsecured and within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search" or "when it is rea-
sonable to believe evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle."2" The Court's decision in Cant 
was clearly limited to searches of automo-
biles incident to arrest, but these two 
courts evidently believed that the Court's 
logic extended (or should be extended in 
the future) to cell phones as well. 
Finally, a number of courts have sup-
pressed evidence found in searches of cell 
phones incident to arrest on the grounds 
that the search was not contemporaneous 
and occurred too long after the arrest. For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Diaz, the 
arrestee's cell phone repeatedly rang while 
he was being booked at the police station." 
Eventually, an officer answered the phone 
and heard the caller attempt to buy drugs. 
Relying in part on the fact that the officer 
answered the phone 20 minutes after 
arrest, a Massachusetts court suppressed 
evidence of the phone call because it 
occurred too long after arrest to be con-
temporaneous. In United States v. LaSalle, 
a federal district judge grappled with a 
much lengthier time gap when police 
searched a cell phone at least two hours 
after the suspect was initially arrested.2" 
The court concluded that such a time peri-
od was not contemporaneous with arrest 
and suppressed the evidence.29 
Importantly, these contemporaneousness 
cases limit, but do not outrightly forbid, 
the search incident to arrest of cell phones. 
Can a Password Save Your 
Cell Phone From the Search 
Incident to Arrest Doctrine? 
As members of the public increasing-
ly become aware that police are conduct-
ing warrantless cell phone searches follow-
ing arrests, they will likely begin to pass-
word protect their phones. To date, courts 
have not been called upon to address 
police authority to bypass passwords dur-
ing searches incident to arrest, but that 
issue will surely arise in the near future. 
Can Police Attempt to 
Break Into a 
Password-Protected Phone? 
Assuming that cell phone users opt to 
password protect their phones, the first 
important question is whether police can 
attempt to decipher and enter the pass-
word without the owner's permission in 
order to access the data on the phone. The 
answer to this question depends on 
whether police have authority to break 
into a locked container. 
Although the search incident to 
arrest doctrine has existed for over 70 
years, the Supreme Court has never clear-
ly stated whether police are permitted to 
unlock containers when searching inci-
dent to arrest. Nevertheless, the Court's 
decision in New York v. Belton (authoriz-
ing the search of the passenger compart-
ment of a vehicle) broadly stated that 
police could search "any" containers, 
whether "open or closed.")U And the dis-
senting justices in Belton clearly expressed 
their belief that the decision extended to 
locked conta iners.!1 
In the years since Belton, there has 
been a fair amount of consensus among 
lower courts permitting police to enter 
locked containers as long as the officers do 
not irreparably damage them. For exam-
ple, over the last three decades, courts 
have almost unanimously32 held that 
police may open locked glove compart-
ments during searches incident to arrest.'·l 
Some courts have gone beyond glove 
compartments to permit searches inci-
dent to arrest of even more secure con-
tainers such as locked safes,'" locked foot-
lockers,'s locked briefcases,'" boxes sealed 
with tape," and locked overnight bags." 
Based on these decisions, it would 
seem clear that police can attempt to crack 
a cell phone password during a search 
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incident to arrest. Just as police are per-
mitted to try all of the keys on the defen-
dant's keychain until locating the one that 
unlocks the glove compartment, police 
should be able to try multiple different 
combinations in an effort to discover the 
password to the phone. 
How Long Can Police Spend 
Trying to Crack a Password? 
Assuming that police can search a 
password-protected phone, a harder ques-
tion is how long they can take in trying to 
break the password. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court has never established any 
clear guideposts for what constitutes a 
contemporaneous search. And, in fact, the 
Court has created a confusing rule where-
by the length of time depends on whether 
the police are sea rching an item on the 
person of an arrestee, as opposed to prop-
erty near the arrestee. 
Searching Items Associated 
With the Person and 
Items That Are Merely 
Nearby Possessions 
In determining how long police can 
spend trying to crack a password , the best 
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place to begin is the question of whether 
cell phones are items immediately associ-
ated with the arrestee or merely posses-
sions near the arrestee. This distinction 
requires us to parse two Supreme Court 
cases from the 1970s. 
In the somewhat obscure Supreme 
Court case of United States v. Edwards, 
police arrested Eugene Edwards at 11 p.m. 
for attempting to break into a government 
build ing.J9 Edwards was promptly brought 
to jail , processed, and placed in a cell. 
Overnight, police discovered that the per-
petrator had attempted to enter a wooden 
window and that he would lil<ely have 
paint chips from the window on his cloth-
ing. The following morning, 10 hours after 
his arrest, police took Edwards' clothing 
fro m him to sea rch for paint chips. 
Edwards moved to suppress the evidence 
on the grounds that tl1e search of his 
clothes occurred too long after arrest to fall 
within the search incident to arrest excep-
tion. The Court rejected Edwards' argu-
ment and gave police wide authority to 
conduct the sea rch incident to arrest well 
after the arrest was conducted. 
Three years later, in the far more 
fa mous Supreme Court case of United 
States v. Chadwick, officers arrested Joseph 
Chadwick as he was trying to load a dou-
ble- locked footlocker into his vehicle. lo 
One set of agents brought Chadwick to a 
federal building and another group of 
agents followed behind witl1 the footlock-
er. Approximately 90 minutes after the 
arrest, federal agents opened the footlock-
er and discovered a large quantity of mar-
ijuana. Unlike in Edwards, the Supreme 
Court rejected the government's argument 
that the footlocker could be searched inci-
dent to arrest. In a brief footnote, the 
Court distinguished Edwards by explain-
ing that " [uJnlike searches of the person, 
searches of possessions within an arrestee's 
immediate control cannot be justified by 
any reduced expectations of privacy 
caused by the arrest:"" The Court further 
explained that " [0] nce law enforcement 
officers have reduced luggage or other per-
sonal property not immediately associated 
with the person of the arrestee to their 
exclusive control, and tl1ere is no longer 
any danger that the arrestee might gain 
access to the property to seize a weapon or 
destroy evidence, a search of that property 
is no longer an incident of the arrest."·" 
The Court's decisions in Edwards 
and Chadwick thus offer two different 
rules for the temporal scope of searches 
incident to arrest. If the search is of items 
associated with the person, police have 
great flexibility and can conduct the 
search many hours after arrest. If, howev-
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er, the police search possessions that are 
not associated with the person and are 
merely nearby, then there is a more rigid 
time limitation. In the three-and-a-half 
decades since the decisions in Edwards 
and Chadwick, the Supreme Court has 
offered no additional guidance. 
Decisions by lower courts, however, 
have concluded that many items are asso-
ciated with the person of an arrestee. In 
addition to clothing, courts have conclud-
ed that wallets," purses,"' dufflebags; 5 and 
backpacks'· fall under Edwards because 
they more closely resemble items on the 
person rather than nearby possessions like 
the footlocker in Chadwick. 
Cell Phones Will Often 
Be Associated With 
The Person, Allowing a 
Lengthy Time to Search 
In order to determine how long 
police can spend trying to crack a cell 
phone password, courts must first deter-
mine whether the phone falls under 
Edwards or Chadwick. Most courts decid-
ing searches incident to arrest of cell 
phones have not addressed this question, 
and the ones that have undertaken the 
task have reached conflicting results. 
A few courts have held that cell 
phones constitute possessions associated 
with the person of an arrestee under 
Edwards and that law enforcement offi-
cers have flexibility in how long they take 
to search the phones incident to arrest." 
Once again, the key case supporting this 
approach is the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
United States v. Finley. 's The Fifth Circuit 
specifically held that Finley's phone 
should not fall into the Chadwick catego-
ry of nearby possessions because the cell 
phone "was on his person at the time of 
his arrest."" 
By contrast, a federal court in 
California concluded that cell phones fell 
into the Chadwick box and rejected a 
search conducted 90 minutes after arrest 
at the police station. In United States v. 
Park, police arrested the defendant on 
marijuana charges and transported him 
to the police station. 50 As Edward Park was 
being booked, police removed a cell 
phone from him and placed it into an 
envelope for safekeeping. Because the 
investigating officer believed the phone 
might have evidence of marijuana traf-
ficking, he instructed other officers to 
search it. The Park court concluded that 
cell phones "should be considered 'posses-
sions within an arrestee's immediate con-
trol' and not part of 'the person."'5t The 
court reached this conclusion because: 
20 WWW.NACDL.ORG 
[Clellular phones have the 
capacity for storing immense 
amounts of private information. 
Unlike pagers or address books, 
modern cell phones record 
incoming and outgoing calls, 
and can also contain address 
books, calendars, voice and text 
messages, email, video and pic-
tures. Individuals can store high-
ly personal information on their 
cell phones, and can record their 
most private thoughts and con-
versations on their cell phones 
through email and text, voice 
and instant messages.-" 
In the battle between the Finley rea-
soning (that cell phones are associated 
with the person of the arrestee) and the 
Park view (that phones are merely nearby 
possessions), the Park court appears to 
have the weaker side of the argument. 
First, courts have repeatedly held that wal-
lets found in arrestees' pockets (as well as 
purses and backpacks on an arrestee) 
should be considered items associated 
with the person of the arrestee that can be 
searched at the station house under 
Edwards. When a cell phone is found in an 
arrestee's pocket, precedent therefore 
strongly suggests it should be searchahlp 
at the station house under Edwards. 
Second, the Park court took the posi-
tion that cell phones are possessions with-
in the arrestee's immediate control 
because they contain a wealth of private 
information. Yet, t11e court offered no 
e:h.'Planation why the quantity of informa-
tion held in a phone had anything to do 
with whether it was associated with his 
person or merely a nearby possession. If a 
large quantify of information precluded 
an item from being associated with the 
person of an arrestee, then arguably a wal-
let should be categorized similarly because 
it contains information about where the 
arrestee banks (via his ATM card), where 
he shops (via his rewards cards), whether 
he has any medical conditions (via med-
ical cards), pictures of his children, and 
more scandalous information such as 
motel key cards, condoms, or the phone 
number of his mistress. These items do 
not cease to be on the person of an 
arrestee simply because they convey a 
wealth of information. 
Moreover, the idea that an electronic 
container cannot be associated with the 
person of an arrestee is inconsistent with 
the use of cell phones in everyday life. 
Many people exercise with an iPhone 
securely strapped to their anns. It is diffi-
cult to comprehend how a cell phone that 
is literally attached to an arrestee's arm 
could not be associated with the person of 
an arrestee. Yet, under the Park court's rea-
soning, cell phones could never be associ-
ated with the person of the arrestee 
because they contain too much data. 
In som e instances, such as cases 
where the phone is found in a briefcase or 
sitting on the fro nt passenger seat of a 
vehicle, it makes sense to say a cell phone 
is a possession near the arrestee. Yet, in 
cases where the cell phone is in the 
arrestee's pocket, attached to his arm, or 
clipped to his belt, it is far less compelling 
to suggest that the phone is never associ-
ated with the person of an arrestee. 
In short, there is no absolute answer 
to the question of whether a cell phone 
should be considered an item associated 
with the person of an arrestee (that can be 
searched hours after arrest under 
Edwards) or merely a nearby possession 
(that must be searched shortly after arrest 
under Chadwick ). The best answer is sim-
ply that the categorization depends on the 
specific facts of the case. In some instances 
police should be permitted to search the 
cell phone hours after arrest at the police 
station, whereas in other cases such elon-
gated searches should be forbidden. 
How Long Can Police Spend 
Searching Cell Phones 
Before the Search Ceases 
To Be Contemporaneous? 
Even if cell phones are possessions 
near an arrestee that can be searched for 
only a short period of time under 
Chadwick, a determination still must be 
made regarding how long officers can 
search at the scene of the arrest. Are offi-
cers limited to five minutes after arrest, or 
can police officers take much longer? 
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to 
this question. 
Although the Supreme Court has 
trumpeted the need for bright-line rules 
in the search incident to arrest contn1, 
the Court has refused to adopt a bright-
line rule dictating how long police can 
take to conduct such searches.53 Not sur-
prisingly, lower court decisions often 
appear to be completely inconsistent with 
one another.s.t 
\Vhile courts have refused to draw 
bright-line time limits on searches inci-
dent to arrest, the contours of the case law 
do suggest that there is an outer time 
limit in run-of-the-mill cases. It is easy to 
locate hundreds of (non-cell phone) 
cases in which courts permitted searches 
incident to arrest five, 10,20, and even 60 
minutes, after arrest. 55 But very few cases 
involve searches more than an hour after 
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arrest. 56 The absence of such cases sug-
gests that there truly is an implicit outer 
limit on the time to conduct searches 
incident to arrest. 
Will Police Have 
Enough Time to 
Crack the Password? 
The key remaining question is 
whether, practically speaking, police will 
be able to successfully crack a cell phone 
password while complying with the time 
limits of the search incident to arrest doc-
trine. The answer to this question likely 
turns on where the cell phone is located 
when the owner is arrested. If the cell 
phone is found on an arrestee or in his 
pocket, it should be considered part of his 
person, giving police the power to bring it 
to the station and search it for hours after 
the arrest. If police discover a cell phone 
within the grabbing space of an arrestee, 
such as in a briefcase or on the passenger 
seat of an automobile, they may sea rch it 
but typically must do so at the scene and 
likely within minutes or at most an hour 
of arrest. Thus, police may have a short 
period of time to try to crack the pass-
word of a cell phone found near an 
arrestee, and they may have a considerably 
longer period of time to crack the pass-
word of a cell phone in the pocket of an 
arrestee. As explained below, they wiIl 
have trouble doing the former, but could 
accomplish the latter. 
If a cell phone must be searched on 
the scene and police have only a few min-
utes to do so, the password willlil<ely pre-
vent the police from accessing the phone's 
con tents. In most cases, police will not be 
able to decipher the password during the 
commotion of an arrest. That sa id, it is 
possible that police could occasionally 
guess the password. One in five Americans 
uses an overly simplistic password such as 
"123456"57 and an officer might simply get 
lucky by trying the most common pass-
words. Additionally, officers have access to 
an arrestee's driver's license that contains 
his birth date and home address, both of 
which are commonly used as passwords. 
Thus, while the chances of an officer 
cracking the password in a short time on 
the scene are limited, it is possible. 
In the cases where police bring the 
cell phone to the station house because it 
is part of the arrestee's person, the chances 
of cracking the password increase dramat-
ically, particularly for certa in phones. Take 
the iPhone as an example. The iPhone's 
password function offers three key protec-
tions: (1) a four-digit numerical code; (2) 
a requirement that consecutively entered 
incorrect passwords disable the phone for 
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a short period before the user can try 
another password, and (3) the option to 
have the contents of the phone deleted if 
the incorrect password is entered 10 
times.5" Unfortunately, these protections 
are extremely weak. 
A four-digit numerical code provides 
only 10,000 combinations. While this 
might prevent most human guessing, it 
would not stop a blunt force computer 
program that sequentially inputs every 
numerical combination. If law enforce-
ment utilized a very simple computer pro-
gram to try all 10,000 combinations in a 
row, they would be able to crack the pass-
word in minutes. While police stations 
likely do not currently have such pro-
grams at their fingertips, it is quite possi-
ble they will in the near future as the tech-
nology becomes more available. 
Moreover, even if police never set up 
the program to crack a password, they 
may be able to bypass the password alto-
gether by hacking into the phone. One 
well-known computer hacker has 
authored a book called "iPhone 
Forensics" that explains how to remove 
data from the phone.59 The same hacker 
proudly advertises that he teaches courses 
to law enforcement agencies, including 
lessons on bypassing passcodes."o 
Even if police agencies lack the money 
or time to enroll any of their officers in 
computer forensics classes, they can turn 
to the numerous Internet videos that show 
users how to access the data on the 
iPhone.'" For some older versions of the 
phone, police only need to tinker with the 
device itself to bypass the password func-
tion altogether in a matter of moments. 
For newer versions of the phone that have 
closed earlier loopholes, police can stiLI 
hack into the phone and would only need 
a laptop, iTunes, and open source forensic 
recovery software." In the comfort of the 
police station, police could therefore gain 
access to the data on a password-protected 
cell phone in a matter of minutes. 
The iPhone Meets the 
Fifth Amendment 
What happens if police are unable to 
break the password on their own? Can 
police ask or even demand that an arrestee 
enter the password himself or verbally 
provide the password? Defense counsel 
will be forced to confront two legal issues: 
(1) whether the Miranda doctrine offers 
any legal protection, and (2) whether 
police compulsion of the password vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination. 
As is often the case, the Miranda 
doctrine is not particularly helpful to the 
defendant. While an arrestee is almost 
certainly in custody and a request for the 
password almost always will amount to 
interrogation ,") invoking Miranda serves 
little purpose because the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine does not apply 
to Miranda violations.6 1 While a confes-
sion that violates Miranda will be sup-
pressed, evidence found thereafter will be 
admissible. Thus, if police obtain an 
arrestee's password in violation of 
Miranda, the statement conceding 
knowledge of the password will be 
barred, but the valuable resulting evi-
dence - the incriminating text messages 
or child pornography found on the 
phone - will be admissible. 
An arrestee will also have a problem 
seeking relief under the Fifth 
Amendment's self-incrimination clause. 
While police badgering an arrestee into 
disclosing his password would seem like a 
quintessential Fifth Amendment viola-
tion, the Supreme Court would likely 
reject such a claim because, hard as it is to 
imagine, police lack the authority to com-
pel an incriminating response for Fifth 
Amendment purposes. In a 2003 plurality 
decision, the Supreme Court concluded 
that an individual who had been improp-
erly interrogated could not raise a self-
incrimination claim in a civil rights law-
suit because no criminal charges had ever 
been filed against him and therefore he 
had not been compelled to incriminate 
himself in a criminal case in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.6s Put differently, 
while police might have forced the indi-
vidual to provide information, they did 
not compel him for Fifth Amendment 
purposes because the protection against 
self-incrimination applies only to testi-
mony in criminal cases. Perhaps for this 
reason, the only two cases in which defen-
dants have been compelled to disclose 
their computer passwords have been in 
response to grand jury subpoenas, not 
police interrogation . 
Accordingly, an arrestee who turned 
over his password in response to police 
demands would not have a strong argu-
ment that his Fifth Amendment protec-
tion aga inst self-incrimination had been 
violated. 
Conclusion 
Password protecting a cell phone is 
undoubtedly a good idea. If the phone is 
lost, the password will help to protect the 
data. And if an individual is arrested, the 
password will make it more difficult for 
police officers to search the phone inci-
dent to arrest. But password protecting 
the phone will not necessarily prevent the 
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police from bypassing the password and 
conducting a warrantless search of the 
phone. As a legal matter, password pro-
tecting the phone provides virtually no 
additional protection against police 
searching a cell phone incident to arrest. 
Longstanding case law permits police to 
attempt to open locked containers when 
searching incident to arrest. Because cell 
phones are often found on the person of 
an arrestee, police can bring them to the 
station where computer savvy officers can 
spend hours attempting to hack into the 
phone without first procuring a warrant. 
Moreover, even if police cannot decipher 
the password on their own, they stand a 
strong chance of acquiring the password 
from simple police interrogation. 
In sum, police in many jurisdictions 
have wide authority to search the contents 
of cell phones - including text messages, 
voicemails, photos, Internet browsing his-
tory, and reams of other data - when 
searching an arrestee incident to arrest. 
Given that password protecting the phone 
does little to curb police power, the 
Supreme Court and legislatures should 
undertake efforts to sca le back law 
enforcement's authority to search digital 
devices incident to arrest. 
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